


# Carbon Tail Risk

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# Intro



# Intro

To what extent carbon-intense firms will be affected by regulation uncertainty?



Whether climate political/ regulatory **uncertainty** is priced in **option market**?



Whether the cost of option protection against downside tail risks is larger for firms with more carbon-intense business models.

# Hypotheses

*HYPOTHESIS 1: The cost of option protection against downside tail and variance risks associated with climate policy uncertainty is higher at carbon-intense firms.*

*HYPOTHESIS 2: The cost of option protection against downside tail risks associated with climate policy uncertainty increases at times when public attention to climate change is higher.*

*HYPOTHESIS 3: The cost of option protection against downside tail risks associated with climate policy uncertainty declined after the election of President Trump in 2016 at carbon-intense firms.*

# Data

## Option market measures

- Implied volatility slope (*SlopeD*)
- Model-free implied skewness (MFIS)
- Variance risk premium (VRP)

## Carbon emission measurement

- Carbon intensity

# Option market measures

## 1, Implied volatility slope (*SlopeD*)

The implied volatility slope measures the steepness of the function that relates implied volatility to moneyness, as measured by the option's Black-Scholes delta. Specifically, *SlopeD* is the slope coefficient from regressing implied volatilities of OTM puts on the corresponding deltas and a constant.

A more positive value of *SlopeD* indicates that deeper OTM puts are relatively more expensive, suggesting a relatively higher cost of protection against downside tail risks.

# Option market measures

## 2, Model-free implied skewness (MFIS)

$$\text{MFIS}(t,\tau) = \frac{e^{r\tau}W(t,\tau) - 3\mu(t,\tau)e^{r\tau}V(t,\tau) + 2\mu(t,\tau)^3}{[e^{r\tau}V(t,\tau) - \mu(t,\tau)^2]^{3/2}}$$

MFIS captures the distribution of the probability mass in the left versus the right tail of the risk-neutral distribution, it can be interpreted as the cost of protection against left tail events relative to the cost of gaining positive realizations on the right tail.

# Option market measures

## 3, Variance risk premium (VRP)

$$VRP_{t,m} = IV_{t,m}^2 - RV_{t,m}^2,$$

VRP is computed as the difference between the risk-neutral expected and the realized variance.



# In short...

SlopeD capture the cost of protection against left tail risk relative to “normal” risks.

VRP captures the cost of protection against general uncertainty-related volatility changes in down and up directions.

MFIS capture the cost of protection against left tail risk relative the right tail.

# Carbon emission measurement

Firm carbon intensity

$$\textit{Carbon Intensity} = \textit{Scope 1/MV industry}$$

As firm-level variation in carbon intensity is largely subsumed by industry-level variation, a firm's industry carbon intensity can be captured by total Scope 1 carbon emissions (in metric tons of CO<sub>2</sub>) of all reporting firms in the industry divided by the total market capitalization of all reporting firms in the industry (in millions \$)

*A. Determinants of carbon intensities or carbon emissions*

Dependent variable:	<i>log(Scope 1/MV firm)</i>		<i>log(Scope 1 firm)</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>log(Scope 1/MV industry)</i>	0.969*** (180.20)	0.940*** (87.06)		
<i>log(Scope 1 industry)</i>			1.015*** (148.91)	0.927*** (50.36)
<i>Industry CDP disclosure</i>				
<i>log(Assets)</i>		0.015 (0.89)		0.342*** (8.77)
<i>Dividends/net income</i>		0.056* (1.78)		0.125** (2.44)
<i>Debt/assets</i>		0.561*** (3.80)		1.123*** (4.19)
<i>EBIT/assets</i>		0.073 (0.23)		2.334*** (3.85)
<i>CapEx/assets</i>		1.807** (2.27)		5.812*** (3.98)
<i>Book-to-market</i>		0.365*** (3.82)		0.142 (0.93)
<i>Returns</i>		0.013 (0.16)		0.059 (0.33)
<i>Institutional ownership</i>		0.212 (1.26)		0.022 (0.09)
<i>CAPM beta</i>		0.093*** (2.98)		0.168** (2.57)
<i>Volatility</i>		-2.444*** (-3.05)		-8.362*** (-4.45)
<i>Oil beta</i>		-0.096 (-1.13)		-0.341* (-1.86)
<i>Time trend</i>		-0.006 (-0.70)		-0.029 (-1.37)

# Test of hypotheses

*HYPOTHESIS 1: The cost of option protection against downside tail and variance risks associated with climate policy uncertainty is higher at carbon-intense firms.*

A Heckman selection model

$$OMM_{i,m,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Log}(\text{Scope 1/MV industry})_{i,t} + \mathbf{x}_{i,t}\boldsymbol{\beta} + u_{i,m,t+1}, \quad (1)$$

$$CDP \text{ disclosure}_{i,t} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Industry CDP disclosure}_{i,t} + \mathbf{x}_{i,t}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + v_{i,t}, \quad (2)$$

# Results

<i>A. Firm-level regressions</i>			
Dependent variable:	<i>SlopeD</i>	<i>MFIS</i>	<i>VRP</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>log(Scope 1/MV industry)</i>	0.006*** (3.85)	-0.002 (-0.70)	0.001*** (3.79)
<i>log(Assets)</i>	-0.029*** (-9.22)	-0.043*** (-8.04)	-0.005*** (-7.10)
<i>Dividends/net income</i>	0.009 (1.54)	-0.014 (-1.26)	-0.000 (-0.00)
<i>Debt/assets</i>	0.038** (2.28)	0.062** (2.00)	0.003 (0.71)
<i>EBIT/assets</i>	-0.187*** (-4.59)	-0.078 (-1.02)	-0.018 (-1.60)
<i>CapEx/assets</i>	-0.374*** (-5.13)	0.216* (1.75)	-0.060** (-2.35)
<i>Book-to-market</i>	0.077*** (8.10)	0.122*** (5.21)	0.016*** (4.30)
<i>Returns</i>	-0.018** (-2.13)	-0.054*** (-2.95)	-0.010* (-1.93)
<i>Institutional ownership</i>	-0.045* (-1.75)	-0.085 (-1.59)	-0.008 (-1.20)
<i>CAPM beta</i>	0.010 (1.42)	-0.033*** (-3.18)	-0.001 (-0.44)
<i>Volatility</i>	-0.687*** (-6.48)	1.926*** (8.27)	
<i>Oil beta</i>	-0.008 (-0.50)	-0.003 (-0.10)	-0.020*** (-2.73)
<i>Time trend</i>	-0.000 (-0.29)	0.033*** (9.93)	-0.001* (-1.67)

# Results

<i>B. Sector-level regressions</i>			
Dependent variable:	<i>SlopeD</i>	<i>MFIS</i>	<i>VRP</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>log(Scope 1/MV sector)</i>	0.037***	-0.067*	0.003
	(2.80)	(-1.92)	(1.46)
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS

# Results

Taken together, the results indicate that higher climate policy uncertainty increases the firm-level likelihood of left and right tail events, and it has some effect on firm-level VRP. On the sector level, where firm-specific risks are diversified away, we observe an effect that is more systematic and concentrated in the left tail. (One other reason sector-level results may differ from those at the firm level is that sector carbon intensities are noisier as we do not have carbon emissions for all firms in a given sector; this may introduce measurement error.)

# Test of hypotheses

*HYPOTHESIS 2: The cost of option protection against downside tail risks associated with climate policy uncertainty increases at times when public attention to climate change is higher.*

Two proxies (dummy variables)

*Negative climate change news high = 1 if Engle et al. (2020) index is above the median;  
Negative climate change news high = 0 otherwise.*

*Climate change SVI high = 1 if the search index is above the median;  
Climate change SVI high = 0 otherwise.*



# Results

Dependent variable:	<i>SlopeD</i>	<i>SlopeD</i>
	(1)	(2)
<i>log(Scope 1/MV industry) x Negative climate change news high</i>	0.002* (1.67)	
<i>log(Scope 1/MV industry) x Climate change SVI high</i>		0.001 (0.45)
<i>log(Scope 1/MV industry)</i>	0.005*** (3.47)	0.006*** (3.61)
<i>Negative climate change news high</i>	-0.003 (-0.82)	
<i>Climate change SVI high</i>		-0.005 (-1.01)

# Test of hypotheses

*HYPOTHESIS 3: The cost of option protection against downside tail risks associated with climate policy uncertainty declined after the election of President Trump in 2016 at carbon-intense firms.*

A difference-in-differences (DiD) model

$$\begin{aligned} OMM_{i,t} = & \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Post Trump election}_t \times \text{Scope 1/MV industry high}_i \\ & + \gamma_2 \text{Scope 1/MV industry high}_i + \gamma_3 \text{Post Trump election}_t + \mathbf{x}_{i,t-1}\boldsymbol{\gamma} \\ & + \epsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned}$$

*Post-Trump election = 1 for observations after Election Day*

*Post-Trump election = 0 for observations before Election Day*

*Scope 1/MV industry high = 1 for the ten industries with the highest carbon intensities*

*Scope 1/MV industry high = 0 otherwise*

# Results

Dependent variable:	<i>SlopeD</i>	<i>SlopeD</i>	<i>SlopeD</i>	<i>SlopeD</i>	<i>SlopeD</i>
Event window:	[-250; +250]	[-250; +250]	[-250; +250]	[-250; +250]	[-250; +250], excl. [-50; +50]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Post-Trump election x Scope 1/MV industry high</i>	-0.025** (-2.18)	-0.029** (-2.43)	-0.025*** (-2.88)	-0.020** (-2.20)	-0.037*** (-2.63)
<i>Scope 1/MV industry high</i>	0.041* (1.67)	0.043* (1.77)			0.046* (1.88)
<i>Post-Trump election</i>	-0.025*** (-4.63)			-0.022*** (-4.33)	-0.036*** (-5.97)

# Conclusion

- Climate policy uncertainty is priced in the option market. Specifically, the cost of option protection against downside tail risk is larger for more carbon-intensive firms.
- The cost of downward option protection is magnified when public attention to climate change spikes.
- The cost of downward option protection has significantly decreased at highly carbon-intensive firms after President Trump's election in 2016, relative to other firms.

# limitation

- Observation of CDP carbon emission is limited

Cheerio!